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Applying Big Data Based Deep Learning System to Intrusion Detection
Wei Zhong , Ning Yu, and Chunyu Ai
Abstract: With vast amounts of data being generated daily and the ever increasing interconnectivity of the world’s
internet infrastructures, a machine learning based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) has become a vital component
to protect our economic and national security. Previous shallow learning and deep learning strategies adopt the
single learning model approach for intrusion detection. The single learning model approach may experience
problems to understand increasingly complicated data distribution of intrusion patterns. Particularly, the single deep
learning model may not be effective to capture unique patterns from intrusive attacks having a small number of
samples. In order to further enhance the performance of machine learning based IDS, we propose the Big Data
based Hierarchical Deep Learning System (BDHDLS). BDHDLS utilizes behavioral features and content features to
understand both network traffic characteristics and information stored in the payload. Each deep learning model in
the BDHDLS concentrates its efforts to learn the unique data distribution in one cluster. This strategy can increase
the detection rate of intrusive attacks as compared to the previous single learning model approaches. Based on
parallel training strategy and big data techniques, the model construction time of BDHDLS is reduced substantially
when multiple machines are deployed.
Key words: intrusion detection; deep learning; convolution neural network; fully connected feedforward neural
network; multi-level clustering algorithm

1

Introduction

With vast amounts of data being created every
day and the ever increasing interconnectivity of the
world’s internet infrastructures, more and more security
vulnerabilities in these infrastructures are discovered
by security experts every month[1] . These security
vulnerabilities create opportunities for cyber criminals to
intrude into these infrastructures and perform malicious
activities[2] . Consequently, cyber security experts and
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designers need to develop various intrusion detection
systems to protect computers and networks from hackers
who may attack the network system and steal and/or
destroy financial, medical, or other valuable information
from databases[2] .
The traditional Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
usually utilizes precise description such as rules or
signatures to monitor traffic[3] . The signature based
approach generally has a low false positive rate. Since
new intrusion techniques are being designed and
invented every day, experts need to frequently update the
database containing these rules and signatures, which is a
labor-intensive process. Sometimes it is very challenging
to develop appropriate signatures for more sophisticated
attacks which are evolved from previous attacks[3] .
Besides traditional intrusion detection systems,
machine learning techniques have been explored by
researchers[4] . Compared with traditional intrusion
detection systems, machine learning techniques can
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automatically reason about intrusive and benign samples
to fit the most appropriate detection model parameters.
Particularly, machine learning techniques can be used
to discover patterns of complex intrusive activities after
examining features represented by the network traffic[5] .
In recent years, the large number of labeled samples,
powerful computational hardware, and breakthrough
in machine learning algorithms have triggered research
community to re-evaluate the significance of machine
learning techniques for intrusion detection[3–6] . The
shallow learning model and the deep learning model
are two main types of machine learning techniques for
intrusion detection systems[3, 4] . The shallow learning
model typically consists of less than three computational
layers[3] . Examples of the shallow learning model
include support vector machine, logistics regression,
and decision tree[7] . A single shallow learning model
is normally constructed on an entire dataset. A single
shallow learning model may encounter difficulty to
discover useful patterns from a large number of training
samples. Researchers have shown that there are mapping
functions that the shallow learning model cannot
learn[7] . In general, the shallow learning model has
not accomplished satisfactory performance for intrusion
detection since the shallow learning model is not
effective to take advantages of patterns offered by the
increasing number of samples.
In the past ten years, deep learning is one of the
most important technical breakthroughs in the artificial
intelligence field. In contrast to the shallow learning,
deep learning generally requires a large number of
neural layers[8, 9] . Deep learning has produced better
results than shallow learning models in the fields
of computer vision, speech recognition, automatic
machine translation, and finance[10, 11] . Advantages of
deep learning in other areas have inspired researchers
to apply deep learning to intrusion detection[12–15] .
Conventionally, a single deep learning model is
constructed on the whole dataset. The single deep
learning model generally works very well when huge
amount of samples are available, such as computer
vision[10] . Under the situation where huge amount of
samples are not available, the single deep learning model
may have troubles[10] . For the intrusion detection task,
the single deep learning based approach may experience
problems to understand increasingly complicated data
distribution of intrusion samples. Particularly, the single
deep learning model may encounter difficulty to capture
unique patterns from the intrusive attacks having a small
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number of samples.
To further enhance performance of a single shallow
learning model and a single deep learning model, we
propose a Big Data based Hierarchical Deep Learning
System (BDHDLS) that organizes multiple deep learning
models using the hierarchical tree structure. The
hierarchical tree structure is developed to partition
samples into multiple level clusters and each deep
learning model trained on related samples in one cluster
is adapted to study the unique data distribution for that
cluster. The construction of BDHDLS has five phases. In
the first phase, behavioral features and content features
are extracted and selected using big data techniques. In
the second phase, the entire dataset is partitioned into
one-level clusters by the parallel improved K-means
clustering approach. Samples in each cluster of the tree
generally display similar traffic patterns[4, 5] . In the third
phase, the hierarchical clustering process is carried out
for each one level cluster with low quality in parallel
to produce the cluster subtree. Then these subtrees
are combined to generate multiple-level hierarchical
trees of clusters. In other words, the entire dataset is
partitioned into multiple clusters in multiple levels. In
the fourth phase, the deep learning model is built for each
cluster in the hierarchical tree to learn the distinctive data
distribution pattern for that cluster. In the final phase,
decision values of deep learning models are merged to
make the final judgement about whether the test sample
is intrusive or not.
Feature extraction and selection have big impact
on performance of deep learning models. In our
proposed model, both behavioral features and content
features are adopted. Behavioral features and content
features are used to analyze traffic patterns in different
angles. Behavioral features describe network traffic
characteristics including source-destination ports/IP
addresses, various packets-level/flow-level statistics,
and durations of connections. The content features
describe the subtle patterns embedded into the payload
information[16] . Combining both types of features can
improve robustness of the learning algorithms. In
order to evaluate different approaches for building the
intrusion detection system, the performance of five
computational models is compared: (1) a single Decision
Tree (DT) built on the entire dataset; (2) a single Support
Vector Machine (SVM) built on the entire dataset; (3)
a single deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
built on the entire dataset; (4) a single model (RNNCNN) combining Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) and
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CNN built on the entire dataset; and (5) BDHDLS built
on the tree structure. SVM and DT are the shallow
learning architecture. CNN is based on the HAST-I
architecture described in Ref. [17]. CNN-RNN is based
on the HAST-II architecture described in Ref. [17]. CNN
and CNN-RNN extract content features from payloads
automatically. Both the combined 5  2 Cross Validation
(CV) F test[18] and the independent test are performed
to evaluate the performance of the intrusion detection
system. The evaluation metrics used in this work include
True Positive Rate (TPR) or detection rate, False Positive
Rate (FPR) or false alarm rate, and accuracy[3, 19] .
Major contributions of this work include (1) utilization
of big data techniques called Apache Spark for feature
selection and clustering; (2) incorporation of both
behavioral and content-based features simultaneously
to improve prediction accuracy; and (3) adoption of
multiple deep learning models in the hierarchical tree
structure to learn unique traffic patterns for each intrusive
attack family.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 discusses the related works. Section 3 describes five
phases of BDHDLS. Section 4 explains the training
set, the testing set, evaluation metrics, and evaluation
methods. Section 5 presents the experimental results
and analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and
points out the future work.

2

Related Work

Traditional signature-based approaches dominate
intrusion detection softwares since they achieve a low
false positive rate[2] . The signature-based approaches
can detect attacks by searching specific patterns
including a set of behavioral sequences in network
traffic or well-known malicious instructions in the
payload of packets[2] . Since the complexity of network
attacks continues to grow rapidly, constant updates of
the signature database are required. These updates are
generally labor intensive. As a result, the lag between
discovery of a new attack strategy and signature updates
can potentially result in failure of identifying new
network threats[1, 2] . Furthermore, the signature-based
approach may not discover attacks with slightly
modified payloads[1, 2] .
In order to avoid potential weaknesses of traditional
signature-based approaches, researchers have employed
the shallow learning models having less than three
computational layers such as DT and SVM for intrusion
detection[2] . These shallow learning models generally
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cannot further improve their performance with the
increasing number of training samples since the shallow
learning models struggle to explore a rich set of
patterns provided by a large number of training samples.
Since a deep learning model can keep boosting their
performance with more and more training samples as
compared to a shallow learning model[3] , researchers
have experimented on a single deep learning model using
the whole dataset for intrusion detection[12–14, 20, 21] .
Constructing a single learning model for a dataset
that combines samples from multiple types of intrusive
attacks has three disadvantages: (1) problem to learn
complicated data distribution; (2) difficulty to capture
patterns from intrusive attacks having a small number of
training samples; and (3) scalability. Firstly, each type of
intrusive attacks has distinctive characteristics, strategy,
and data distribution[2] . Additionally, the variety and
sophistication of intrusive attacks keep growing quickly
due to new attacking strategies that are created each
year[2] . As a result, combining different types of intrusive
attacks into one dataset can increase the complexity of
the entire dataset significantly and make the learning task
more challenging[2] . Secondly, some types of intrusive
attacks only have a small number of samples. After
merging these types of intrusive attacks having a small
number of training samples into the entire large dataset,
it is difficult for the deep learning model to learn patterns
of these intrusive attacks. Thirdly, constructing a single
deep learning model is not scalable to study patterns of
increasingly big intrusion detection datasets. Training
deep learning models with millions of samples may
require several weeks to complete[22] . The expensive
training cost may hamper efforts to explore different
deep learning architectures quickly so that researchers
can adjust detection strategies and techniques in order to
respond to new variants of attacks.
Choosing the appropriate set of features is another
critical issue for machine learning algorithms.
Behavioral features and content features are two
main types of features adopted by machine learning
based IDS[2] . These two types of features are used to
analyze the pattern of the intrusive activities in different
angles. The behavioral features focus on network
traffic characteristics, such as source-destination
ports/IP addresses, various packets-level/flow-level
statistics, and duration of collections. Various deep
neural networks were developed in recent literatures to
evaluate the network behaviors[23–32] . In the contrast,
content features are used to uncover patterns of
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intrusions through the content of payloads in the traffic.
Deep examination of payloads may reveal valuable
information related to exploit methods, malicious
actions, or illegal commands[16] . Both behavioral feature
based approaches and content feature based approaches
have their advantages and disadvantages. Behavioral
feature based approaches may not discover all intrusive
activities since behavioral features only capture network
traffic characteristics. Content feature based approaches
are the powerful tools to recognize intrusive activities.
However, content feature based approaches may suffer
from payload obfuscation, which may be achieved by
polymorphism and metamorphism. In the meantime, it
is difficult for the attacker to obfuscate its behavioral
patterns[2] . Most of current researches use either
behavioral features or content features. To the best of
our knowledge, no research has combined behavioral
and content features systematically and intelligently.
For content feature extraction, the scalability is another
major issue. Since billions of candidate content features
can be extracted from payloads, big data techniques
are suitable to handle this overwhelming amount of
data[30, 33] .
To overcome potential weaknesses of previous
approaches, we propose a BDHDLS for intrusion
detection. In the proposed BDHDLS, each deep learning
model in the tree structure is constructed on the data
subset for a particular group of intrusive attack families.
Hence, each model is specialized to study the data
distribution for a specific group of intrusive attacks
and all deep learning models in the hierarchical tree
cooperate to make the final decision. As compared to
previous approaches for intrusion detection, BDHDLS
has better chances to learn unique data distribution
patterns for each intrusive attack family. As compared
to previous approaches who only use either behavioral
features or content features, BDHDLS considers both
behavioral features and content features to enhance the
capability to understand increasingly complex intrusion
data distribution. In order to address IDS scalability
issues, BDHDLS adopts big data techniques to extract
features and parallel strategies to accomplish clustering
and model training.
This work is motivated by the multi-level deep
learning model for malware detection[34] . As compared
to malware detection, this work for intrusion detection
creates unique challenges and requires different
strategies to select useful features and build multi-level
clusters. Particularly, feature selection and clustering
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process require utilization of big data techniques in order
to speed up the time and space intensive computational
process. In this work, selection of appropriate deep
learning architecture and its hyper parameter is highly
dependent on feature extraction from behavioral and
content characteristics from the network traffic. As
a result, the process of deep learning training and
parameter tuning in this work is quite different from
the model construction process for malware detection.

3

BDHDLS for Intrusion Detection

Construction of BDHDLS is divided into five phases:
Phase 1: Generating behavioral features and content
features using big data techniques; Phase 2: Partitioning
the dataset into multiple one-level clusters using Spark
based parallel improved K-means algorithm; Phase 3:
Generating multi-level cluster trees in parallel; Phase
4: Building the deep learning model for each cluster;
Phase 5: Merging decisions from deep learning models
in different clusters to classify samples as intrusive or
benign. The flow-chart to construct BDHDLS is shown
in Fig. 1.
3.1

Generation of behavioral features and content
features

Since different choices of features can impact
the performance of machine learning algorithms
significantly, feature generation and extraction are one of
the most important tasks for any machine learning model.
In this section, the process of producing behavioral
features and content features is discussed.
At first, behavioral features are generated after
analyzing network traffic. Behavioral features in this
work include the number of data bytes from source to
destination, various packets-level/flow-level statistics,
type of the protocol, and duration of collection[16] . In
other words, behavioral features are used to reflect
characteristics of network traffic patterns.
After generating behavioral features, content features
are extracted from payloads in order to uncover vital
information embedded into the payload, which is
the primary location for intruders to initiate a set
of malicious instructions, exploit methods, or illegal
commands[16] . In the first step of content feature
extraction, n-grams (n-byte sequences) are generated
by sliding an n-byte window. After payloads for all
samples in the whole dataset are processed, frequencies
of unique n-grams appearing in the benign samples
and intrusive samples are calculated, respectively. It
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Fig. 1
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Flow chart for building BDHDLS, where FC represents Full Connected feed forward neural network.

is generally inappropriate to use all byte n-gram features
extracted from payloads. When the classifier is trained
with the exponential number of such binary n-gram
features, the effectiveness of a classifier can be reduced
significantly since most of these features may be noisy,
redundant, or irrelevant. In order to avoid these problems,
candidate binary n-gram features need to be sorted based
on certain criterion so that a small subset of features
with the greatest discriminatory power can be selected
for model construction.
The information gain is used as the selection criterion
for important content features in this work since it is
one of the most effective feature selection measures
reported in literatures[2, 35] . In this work, the information
gain is utilized to measure the effectiveness of a feature
to classify the training data. If the training data is
split based on values of this feature, information gain
measures the expected reduction in entropy after the
split. The feature with higher information gain is more
effective to classify the samples. The information gain
can be defined as Eq. (1)[35] :
Gain.A/ D Info.D/ InfoA .D/
(1)
where Info.D/ is the original information requirement
and InfoA .D/ is the new requirement after splitting on
the feature A. Info.D/ is defined as Eq. (2):

pos
pos
neg
neg
log2
log2
(2)
total
total total
total
where pos is the total number of positive (intrusive)
samples in I , total is the total number of samples in I ,
and neg is the total number of negative (benign) samples
in I . I represents the whole dataset in Eq. (2). InfoA .D/
is defined as Eq. (3):
X totalv  pos
posv
v
InfoA .D/ D
log2
total
totalv
totalv
v2.0;1/

negv
negv
(3)
log2
totalv
totalv
The feature extraction and selection process can
be time consuming and space intensive for very
large datasets. In order to provide the efficient and
effective solution for feature selection, the Spark (inmemory MapReduce) framework is utilized to perform
parallel tasks for byte n-gram extraction and selection
in the cluster of machines. The Spark (in-memory
MapReduce) framework can process large datasets in
parallel, distributing the workload across large clusters
of commodity machines.
Figure 2 shows major steps to extract important
content features using the Spark framework. Based on
the Spark framework, the training dataset samples are
evenly distributed among m nodes in the cluster. Byte
Info.D/ D
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in a sample, its value is 1; otherwise, its value is 0.
3.2

Fig. 2 Major steps to extract important content-based
features using the Spark framework.

n-grams are extracted from each training file in parallel,
using m nodes in the cloud cluster (Fig. 2, Step 1). For
example, byte 2-gram EE12 is observed once in one
positive (intrusive) sample in Node 1, and meanwhile
it is observed once in a negative (benign) sample in
Node 2. This is denoted by (EE12, C) and (EE12, )
under Nodes 1 and 2, respectively, in Step 1 of Fig.
2. In Step 2 of Fig. 2, the in-memory MapReduce
program first aggregates labels of identical n-grams. As
a result, the aggregated pair for EE12 is (EE12, C; ).
The aggregated n-grams are distributed to reducers
in the m nodes of the cloud cluster. Each reducer
counts aggregated labels to obtain a positive count and
a negative count. The positive count shows how many
intrusive samples contain the particular feature. The
negative count shows how many benign samples contain
the particular feature. This is denoted by (EE12, 1, 1)
in Step 2 of Fig. 2. In Step 3 of Fig. 2, the in-memory
MapReduce program calculates the information gain of
each byte n-gram feature and sorts these byte n-gram
features based on the information gain. In Step 4 of
Fig. 2, the reduce phase selects the best feature based
on the information gain using one node while the map
phase does nothing. Each feature in a content feature set
is a binary feature. If the given content feature is present

Generation of one-level clusters

After behavioral and content features are generated,
these features are used to produce one-level clusters
with the K-means algorithm. Initialization techniques
and scalability are two major issues for the traditional Kmeans algorithms. Traditional K-means algorithms[36]
randomly select samples as initial cluster centers. This
strategy can result in distorted or improper partitions,
which may be deviated from globally optimal solutions.
For instance, a small number of clusters may capture a
large percentage of samples and remaining clusters may
gather a few number of samples due to random choice of
initial cluster centers. Traditional K-means algorithms
also face the challenge to process large number of
samples efficiently[36] .
In order to tackle issues of random selection and
scalability, the parallel improved K-means clustering
using Apache Spark[37] is developed in this work.
The parallel K-means algorithm adopts the greedy
initialization techniques[38] to overcome weaknesses
of random initialization. The goal of the greedy
initialization technique is to choose proper initial
points, which can lead to the final clustering solution
representing the underlying data distribution more
accurately and consistently.
Each iteration of the parallel K-means clustering has
two phases: (1) the mapping phase and (2) reducing
phase. In the mapping phase, the closest centroid for each
sample located in different data partitions is computed
in parallel. Each data partition of the dataset is placed in
different machines. In the reducing phase, the centroid
for each cluster is recomputed after acquiring the partial
sum for the centroid from each data partition for one
cluster. This divide-and-conquer strategy can allow
the clustering algorithm to handle millions of samples
efficiently. The distance score between the sample and
the cluster center is defined as Eq. (4):
N
X
dist.x; c/ D
(4)
jFx .i / Fc .i /j
i D1

where N is the number of features for each sample,
Fx .i / is the value of the feature at index i for the sample
x, and Fc .i / is the value of the feature at index i for the
centroid of the given cluster.
3.3

Generation of hierarchical based cluster tree

The goal of one-level clusters carried out by the
improved K-means clustering is to group samples with
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similar patterns into the same cluster. Analysis of onelevel clustering demonstrates that some of these onelevel clusters have low quality. The quality of the cluster
is defined as Eq. (5):
Cluster Quality.%/ D max.Pbenign ; Pintrusive /
(5)
where Pbenign is the percentage of benign samples in the
given cluster and Pintrusive is the percentage of samples
belonging to intrusive samples in the given cluster. For
example, if the percentage of benign samples in the given
cluster is 20% and the percentage of intrusive samples
in the same cluster is 80%, the quality of this cluster is
80%.
The parallel multi-level clustering is implemented
to find out the high quality subclusters from one-level
clusters having low quality. The parallel multi-level
clustering has 2 steps: (1) local discovery step and
(2) merging step. In the local discovery step, the
agglomerative hierarchical clustering[35] is performed on
each one-level clusters having low quality. During this
process, subclusters in these one-level clusters continue
to merge until the quality of the merged clusters drops
below the given threshold. At the end of the local
discovery step, a forest of cluster subtrees is created.
In the merging step, the root clusters of each subtree are
combined until the quality of the merged clusters drops
below the given threshold. In this work, the multi-level
tree structure is used to learn unique underlying data
distribution patterns of a particular sample subspace in
the given level of the tree.
3.4

Deep learning model training for each cluster

The hierarchical clustering algorithm can discover some
high-quality subclusters from one-level clusters. Since
it is difficult to accurately define the distance function
for calculating similarity between samples, the noisy
and irrelevant information can still be incorporated into
each cluster in the multi-level hierarchical tree structure.
These noisy and irrelevant information can considerably
decrease the effectiveness of the intrusion detection
system.
In order to improve the intrusion detection
performance of the hierarchical tree structure, the deep
learning model is trained for each cluster in the multilevel cluster tree based on combination of behavioral
features and content features. Three different types of
deep learning models including FC, CNN, and RNN
are evaluated in order to select the best model for each
cluster in the multi-level cluster tree.
The deep FC has many layers of computational units
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interconnected in a feed-forward fashion. FC is the most
general deep learning model to figure out transformation
functions. Since architecture of FC does not take the
structure of data into consideration, it may face difficulty
to handle data with special characteristics.
CNN focuses on determining spatial patterns of
traffic byte information from the payload, which can
be represented as the matrix of zeros and ones[17] . CNN
contains many convolutional and pooling layers, several
dense layers, and the softmax output layer[39] . Figure 3
illustrates the architecture of the deep CNN. Compared
to the regular deep fully connected network, the CNN has
two major characteristics: (1) sparsity of connection and
(2) weight sharing. These two characteristics allow CNN
to extract features from the raw data automatically. As
the computational layers go deeper and deeper, the CNN
can gradually combine simple features in the earlier
layers into more complex features in the later layers
after uncovering the relationship between neighboring
input feature vectors[39] . The CNN is particularly robust
against code obfuscation and instruction reordering in
the payload since CNN can find out lower-to-higher
order local features that are intrinsic for the functionality
of intrusive attacks.
RNN is the special type of neural network. Taking
sequential information into consideration, each output of
RNN depends on previous outputs. RNN is specifically
built to examine the sequence of payloads in one sample
in order to learn the sequential dependence[17] . Figure 4
illustrates the architecture of the deep RNN.
With combination of behavioral features and content
features, the deep learning model is designed to analyze
both patterns of network traffic characteristics and
distinctive information in the payload of the traffic
sample for each cluster. Each deep learning model can
concentrate on highly similar samples in each cluster

Fig. 3

Diagram for CNN.
y<t>
Sigmoid

a[1]<0>

LSTM
a[1]<1>
x[1]

LSTM
a[1]<2>

…

LSTM
a[1]<t−1>

LSTM
a[1]<t>

x[2]

…

x[t−1]

x[t]

Fig. 4

Diagram for RNN.
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without being distracted by unrelated information from
other clusters. As a result, the learning efficiency for
each deep learning model can be enhanced.
The core of deep FC, CNN, and RNN is the function
mapping from the input vector to the output vector for a
large number of layers. The mapping function for each
layer of the deep learning model is defined as Eq. (6)[39] :
ai C1 D fi .Wi  ai C bi /
(6)
where ai is the activation of the i -th layer, Wi is the
weight matrix for i-th layer, bi is the bias for i-th layer,
and fi is the activation function. The loss function is
used to measure the difference between the real output
and the predicted output. The loss function for all 3
types of neural networks is defined as Eq. (7)[39] :
M
X
Loss.y; y/
O D
Œyi log yOi C .1 yi / log yOi  (7)
i D1

where yi is the true label for sample i , yi 2 0; 1 with
0 representing benign sample and 1 malware. yOi is the
output of our deep learning model for sample i. M is
the size of one batch.
Based on the loss function, the cost function provides
important guidance about how to optimize parameters
of deep learning models. The cost function is defined as
Eq. (8):
m
1 X
J.w1 ; b1 ; : : :/ D
Loss.y .i / ; yO .i / /
(8)
m
i D1

where J.w1 ; b1 ; : : :/ represents the optimization cost in
respect of all weights and bias.
The formula to adjust the network parameters during
one iteration of gradient descent is defined as Eq. (9):
@ Loss.y; y/
O
wDw ˛
(9)
@w
where ˛ is the learning rate.
3.5

Decision fusion algorithm

The deep learning model’s decision function for the
cluster k to classify sample x as benign or intrusive is
expressed as Eq. (10):
fk .x/ D Sigmoid.Wk  yk C bk /
(10)
where yk is the “activation” of the last layer of the neural
network for the cluster k and Wk is the weight matrix
between the last layer and the output layer of neural
networks for cluster k. The decision value reveals how
confident the deep learning model predicts the sample
as benign or intrusive.
Deep learning models are constructed in different
clusters with quite different data distributions. In order
to compare classification values from different models

fairly and objectively, the classification value, fk .x/,
of the deep learning model is normalized using the
z-score[35] . This normalization process is necessary,
because decision functions of deep learning models
for different clusters are calculated from various highdimensional feature spaces formed by related samples
belonging to the same cluster[39] . The normalized
decision value of the cluster k for sample x is defined as
Eq. (11):
fk .x/ meank
decision valuek .x/ D
(11)
ık
where meank is the mean classification values of the
deep learning model in cluster k and ık is the standard
deviation of classification values of the deep learning
model for the cluster k. Higher decision value shows
that the deep learning model is more confident to classify
a given sample.
Since the distance between the sample and the cluster
associated with this deep learning model can affect the
confidence level of the decision value, the deep learning
decision value for the cluster is weighted by the distance
between the sample and the cluster associated with the
deep learning model. The distance function is defined as
Eq. (12):
N
X
dist.k; x/ D
(12)
jFx .i / Fk .i /j
i D1

where Fx .i / is the value of features at index i for the
sample x and Fk .i / is the value of features at index i for
the centroid of cluster k. The logistic function used to
smooth the distance between the sample x and cluster k
is defined as Eq. (13):
1
smooth dist.k; x/ D
(13)
1 C e dist.k;x/
where k is the cluster k and x is the given sample. As
a result, the weighted decision value for a sample x is
defined as Eq. (14):
.k; x/ D decision valuek .x/  smooth dist.k; x/
(14)
If the training accuracy of the deep learning models for
a given cluster falls below the given threshold, these
models will be excluded from the decision making
process since these models have low quality. Finally,
the highest weighted decision value is utilized to classify
samples. Figure 5 shows the detailed algorithm to build
BDHDLS.

4

Datasets and Experimental Setup

In this section, datasets for the combined 5  2 CV F test
and independent test are discussed first, then the details
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Fig. 5

Five phases of BDHDLS.

of performance metrics and model configurations are
explained.
4.1
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Datasets for combined 5  2 cross validation F
test and independent test

The dataset used to build the intrusion detection model
needs containing a comprehensive and extensive set
of intrusion with the complete profile of real-time
background traffic[16] . The dataset also needs providing
the raw data with the payload information. The raw
data with the payload information is very important for
providing a clear and complete information about how
intrusive attacks may affect the network and how the
servers can respond to such an intrusion[16] . The popular
public datasets such as NSL-KDD[40] and Kyoto2009[41]
do not contain raw traffic data. DARPA1998[42] ,
ISCX2012[16] , and CICIDS2017[43] are only public
benchmark datasets containing raw traffic data with both
labeled benign and intrusive samples. Each sample in
this work is defined as one network flow, consisting of
multiple network packets communicated between 2 sides.
These traffic bytes from multiple packets are combined
to form one sample.
The DARPA1998 dataset consists of benign samples
and four types of intrusive samples including DoS, Probe,

U2R, and R2L[42] . The DARPA1998 dataset contains
3.5 million samples. The ISCX2012 dataset is the
public benchmark dataset which captures the complete
network interaction and payload information. It contains
various multi-stage attacks with realistic background
traffic[16] . The ISCX2012 dataset has 1.4 million benign
samples and around 41 000 intrusive samples. Four
types of intrusive samples in the ISCX2012 dataset
include BFSSH, DDos, HttpDos, and Infiltrating, which
is more realistic than the DARPA1998 dataset[16] . The
CICIDS2017 dataset is the latest dataset that contains
benign and intrusive samples. The type of intrusive
samples in the CICIDS2017 dataset include Botnet,
Web Attack XSS, Web Attack BF, Patator, Port Scan,
and Dos[43] . The CICIDS2017 dataset has 2.8 million
samples.
In this work, several computational models are tested
using these three datasets, respectively. For each dataset,
80% of samples are randomly selected for model training
and the combined 5  2 cross validation F test. The
remaining 20% of samples serve as the independent
testing set.
During data preprocessing, the pkt2flow tool[44] is
used to split raw pcap files into multiple network flows.
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4.2

Performance evaluation metrics

True positive rate, false positive rate, and accuracy are
adopted to evaluate the performance of the intrusion
detection system. TPR is defined as Eq. (15)[45] :
TP
(15)
TPR D
TP C FN
where True Positive (TP) represents the number of
intrusive samples that are correctly recognized and
False Negative (FN) represents the number of intrusive
samples that are incorrectly recognized as benign
samples. TPR is also called the detection rate. FPR
is defined as Eq. (16)[45] :
FP
FPR D
(16)
FP C TN
where False Positive (FP) represents the number of
benign samples that are incorrectly recognized as
intrusive samples and True Negative (TN) represents the
number of benign samples that are correctly recognized.
FPR is also called the false alarm rate. The accuracy is
defined as Eq. (17):
TP C TN
Accuracy D
(17)
TP C FP C TN C FN
4.3

Model configuration for different clusters in
the subtree

In Table 1, model configurations of CNN are explained
in details. In Table 2, model configurations for FC are
represented. In Table 3, model configurations for RNN
are shown.
The cross-validation technique is used to choose the
Table 1
Model configuration 1
1 Conv layer (64 5  5 filters)
Max-pooling layer
1 Conv layer (128 5  5 filters)
Max-pooling layer
1 Conv layer (256 5  5 filters)
Max-pooling layer
1 FC layer (1024 neurons)
Sigmoid output layer

Number of layers
8
8
12
12
16
16

Table 3 Model configurations of recurrent neural network.
Hyper parameter
Depth
Number of neurons
LSTM-1
1
128
LSTM-2
2
256

best model configuration. Leaky Relu is selected as
activation functions for all models. The dropout rate
is set to 0.1 to avoid overfitting. The combined 5  2
CV F test is adopted to choose the most suitable model
configuration for each cluster.

5

Experimental Result and Analysis

In this section, experimental results for the combined
5  2 CV F test and the independent test are reported for
three datasets.
5.1

Performance comparison of different feature
sets

At first, performance of different feature sets are
compared. Figure 6 compares TPR and accuracy (ACC)
for different feature sets in the ISCX2012 dataset.
Figure 7 compares FPR for different feature sets in
100
Value (%)

190

Behavioral

Content

Both

95
90
85
80

TPR

ACC

Fig. 6 TPR and ACC for different feature sets in the
ISCX2012 dataset.

Model configurations of convolutional neural network.
Model configuration 2
Model configuration 3
3 Conv layers (64 5  5 filters)
5 Conv layers (64 5  5 filters)
Max-pooling layer
Max-pooling layer
3 Conv layers (128 5  5 filters)
5 Conv layers (128 5  5 filters)
Max-pooling layer
Max-pooling layer
3 Conv layers (256 5  5 filters)
5 Conv layers (256 5  5 filters)
Max-pooling layer
Max-pooling layer
3 FC layers (1024 neurons)
5 FC layers (1024 neurons)
Sigmoid output layer
Sigmoid output layer
Table 2 Model configurations of FC.
Number of neurons
[128, 128, 128, 128, 64, 64, 64, 64]
[64, 64, 64, 64, 128, 128, 128, 128]
[256, 256, 256, 256, 128, 128, 128, 128, 64, 64, 64, 64]
[64, 64, 64, 64, 128, 128, 128, 128, 256, 256, 256, 256]
[256, 256, 256, 256, 128, 128, 128, 128, 64, 64, 64, 64, 32, 32, 32, 32]
[32, 32, 32, 32, 64, 64, 64, 64, 128, 128, 128, 128, 256, 256, 256, 256]

0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0

Behavioral

Content

the ISCX2012 dataset. Our results demonstrate that
combination of both behavioral features and content
features performs best. Comparison of different feature
sets in other two datasets shows similar trends.
Results for ISCX2012 dataset

In this section, the independent test results for the
ISCX2012 dataset are discussed. Then the statistical
analysis for the combined 5  2 CV F test for the
ISCX2012 dataset is performed.
5.2.1

Independent test results for ISCX2012
dataset

Number of samples

Figure 8 shows the number of samples for different
intrusive attacks in the ISCX2012 dataset.
In Fig. 9, TPR and ACC for the ISCX2012 dataset
were presented. In Fig. 10, false positive rate (false alarm
rate) for five models is compared. The implementation of
CNN is based on the HAST-I model and implementation
of CNN-RNN is based on the HAST-II model[17] .
Compared with the CNN-RNN model, BDHDLS
improves TPR by 2.5 percentage points. The FPR of
20 000
16 000
12 000
8000
4000
0

HttpDos

BFSSH Infiltrating

DDoS

Fig. 8 Number of samples of different intrusive attacks for
ISCX2012 dataset.

Value (%)

100
90

DT

80

SVM

70

CNN

60

CNN-RNN

50
Fig. 9

BDHDLS
TPR

ACC

TPR and ACC for ISCX2012 dataset.

0.2
0.1
0

Both

Fig. 7 FPR for different feature sets in the ISCX2012
dataset.
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0.3
FPR (%)

FPR (%)
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DT

Fig. 10

SVM

CNN

CNN-RNN BDHDLS

FPR for ISCX2012 dataset.

BDHDLS is comparable to other computational models.
Figures 9 and 10 also show that in general deep learning
models perform better than the shallow learning models.
As a result of hierarchical learning structure adoption,
the performance of BDHDLS is better than other single
deep learning approaches.
5.2.2

Statistical analysis of intrusion detection
performance for the 5  2 CV F test in the
ISCX2012 dataset

Besides the independent testing carried out in the testing
set, the combined 5  2 CV F test is performed in the
training set to determine whether the intrusion detection
performance improvement of BDHDLS over the other
four models in the ISCX2012 dataset is statistically
significant.
The p-value produced by the combined 5  2 CV
F test specifies the significant level at which the null
hypothesis that algorithms have the same error rate
can be rejected. Lower p-value usually implies a more
statistically significant improvement of BDHDLS over
the other four models. In this work, the significant
level for p-value is set to 1%, which is more rigorous
than 5% typically chosen by statistician. Table 4 shows
“p value by F test” when binary classification of five
computational models are performed. Experimental
results from Table 4 indicate that performance gains of
BDHDLS over the other four computational models in
terms of all evaluation metric are statistically significant.
5.3

Results for CICIDS2017 dataset

In this section, the independent test results for the
CICIDS2017 dataset are discussed. Then the statistical
analysis for the combined 5  2 CV F test for the
Table 4 “p value by F test” for binary classification in the
ISCX2012 dataset.
(%)
Model
FPR
TPR
ACC
DT
<0.1
<0.1
<0.1
SVM
<0.1
<0.1
<0.1
CNN
<0.1
0.2
0.7
RNN-CNN
0.8
0.3
0.9
BDHDLS
N/A
N/A
N/A
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5.3.2

CICIDS2017 dataset is conducted.
Independent test results for CICIDS2017
dataset

Figure 11 indicates that the number of samples for
different intrusive attacks in the CICIDS2017 dataset.
The following results are obtained from the
independent test dataset. In Fig. 12, TPR and ACC for
the independent testing in the CICIDS2017 dataset are
presented. In Fig. 13, the false positive rate (false alarm
rate) in the CICIDS2017 for five models is compared.
The BDHDLS improves the TPR by around 2 percentage
point as compared to CNN-RNN.
284 496

Number of samples (×104)

30
25

5.4

20

158 824

15
10
5
0

642 1487 1956
Web Web
attack attack
XSS
BF

13 842

Botnet Patator Port
Scan

Dos

Fig. 11 Number of samples for different intrusive attacks in
the CICIDS2017 dataset.

Value (%)

100
90

DT

80

SVM

70

CNN

60

CNN-RNN

50
Fig. 12

FPR (%)

Results for DARPA1998 dataset

In this section, the independent test results for the
DARPA1998 dataset are discussed. Figure 14 indicates
that the number of samples for different intrusive attacks
in the DARPA1998 dataset. U2R and R2L have the
fewest number of samples. The following results are
obtained from the independent test dataset. Figures 15
and 16 compare the binary classification performance of
four computational models for the DARPA1998 dataset.
RNN-CNN is not built for DARPA1998 dataset since the
number of packets for each sample is very small. The
Table 5 “p value by F test” for binary classification in the
CICIDS2017 dataset.
(%)
Model
FPR
TPR
ACC
DT
<0.1
<0.1
<0.1
SVM
<0.1
<0.1
<0.1
CNN
<0.1
<0.1
0.4
RNN-CNN
0.9
0.6
0.8
BDHDLS
N/A
N/A
N/A

BDHDLS
TPR

ACC

TPR and ACC for CICIDS2017 dataset.

0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Besides the independent testing carried out in the testing
set, the combined 5  2 CV F test is performed in the
training set to determine whether the intrusion detection
performance improvement of BDHDLS over the other
four models in the CICIDS2017 dataset is statistically
significant. Table 5 shows “p value by F test” when
binary classification of five computational models are
performed in the CICIDS2017 dataset. Experimental
results from Table 5 indicate that performance gains
of BDHDLS over the other four computational models
in terms of all evaluation metrics are statistically
significant.

18
14
10
6
2
--2

DT

Fig. 13

SVM

CNN

CNN-RNN

BDHDLS

FPR for CICIDS2017 dataset.

2 143 172

22
Number of samples (×105)

5.3.1

Statistical analysis of intrusion detection
performance for the 5  2 CV F test in the
CICIDS2017 dataset

430

14 421

U2R

R2L

88 862
Probe

DoS

Fig. 14 Number of samples for different intrusive attacks in
the DARPA1998 dataset.
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Value (%)
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CNN

85
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80
Fig. 15

TPR
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TPR and ACC for DARPA1998 dataset.

FPR (%)

1.0
0.5
0
Fig. 16

DT

SVM

CNN

BDHDLS

FPR for the DARPA1998 dataset.

small number of packets per sample does not work well
for LSTM, which need learn the temporal information
of a long sequence of data. BDHDLS improves the
classification performance as compared to other three
computational models.
5.5

Construction time for BDHDLS when different
numbers of machines are used

Figure 17 indicates the average construction time (in
hours) of BDHDLS for 5  2 CV F test in the ISCX2012
dataset. The average construction time for BDHDLS is
12 hours when the 64 machines are used. The average
construction time for BDHDLS has been reduced
substantially when multiple machines are deployed.

6

Conclusion and Future Work

In this work, BDHDLS is proposed to focus its efforts on
learning distinctive data distribution of specific intrusive
attacks belonging to certain families. This strategy is
particularly effective to capture subtle data patterns for
intrusive attacks having a small number of samples.

Time (h)

BDHDLS also adopts both behavioral features and
content features. Considering both behavioral features
and content features together allows BDHDLS to
analyze intrusive attack samples using both network
traffic characteristics and contents in the payload. This
tactics can boost the performance of IDS since previous
approaches never combine both types of features
together. Our study also shows that big data techniques
and parallel strategies for feature selection, clustering,
and training can reduce the model construction time
significantly. This allows researchers to iterate faster to
search the best model parameters for their computational
problems.
In this work, the simple decision fusion strategy is
used to combine the output of different deep learning
models in the cluster. This technique may not be
the optimal solution; therefore, advanced decision
fusion algorithms combining outputs from different
deep learning models in the tree can be experimented
in the near future. We plan to experiment on using
deep neural networks to merge decisions from different
models in the tree instead of defining merging strategies
by human experts. Since feature selection and adoption
has significant impacts on performance of deep learning
models, we also plan to incorporate new sets of
behavioral features into deep learning models in order
to enhance the performance. The fast techniques to
generate multi-level cluster tree also need to be explored
to further reduce the model construction. As compared
to the single deep learning approach, BDHDLS uses
much more computational resources in order to achieve
the performance gains. How to reduce the required
minimum computational resources in order to achieve
the similar performance gains will be studied in the near
future.
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